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STATEMENT OF 
• 
ANDREW M. KRAMER 
APPEARING ON BEHALF OF 
THE MANAGEMENT LAWYERS WORKING GROUP" 
BEFORE THE 
COMMISSION FOR THE FUTURE OF 
WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS 
September 8, 1994 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Commission: My name is 
Andrew M. Kramer and I am a Partner in the law firm of 
Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue. I appear today on behalf of the 
Management Lawyers Working Group. For over twenty-five years I 
have represented public and private employers throughout the 
United States in all phases of labor and employment law. In 
1973, I drafted the Executive Order in Illinois giving Illinois 
state employees the right to bargain and took leave from private 
practice to chair the agency which implemented that order. Thus, 
I have a long and sustained interest in the issues that are 
before this Commission. 
FIRST CONTRACT ARBITRATION 
My comments today will be directed at several of the 
questions which the Commission set forth in its May, 1994 
Fact Finding Report. In its Report, the Commission, among other 
things, asked about what might be done "to increase the 
probability" that workers who successfully organize achieve "a 
first contract and on-going collective bargaining relationship." 
This question seemingly presumes that "something" should be done. 
Indeed, it has been suggested to the Commission that that 
"something" should be binding arbitration if an impasse in 
bargaining is reached in first contract settings.1 While I 
strongly believe that the Commission should reject the imposition 
1
 Statement of Julius Getman at p. 8. See, also, Weiler, 
Striking A New Balance: Freedom Of Contract And The Prospects Of 
Union Representation. 98 Harv. L. Rev. 351, 405-412 (1984); 
Gottesman, In Despair. Starting Over: Imagining A Labor Law For 
Unorganized Workers. 69 Chi. Kent L. Rev. 59, 95-96 (1993). 
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of interest arbitration for first contracts, I also, however, 
believe that there is a potential for greater use of mediation as 
a device to promote agreement on a voluntary basis. 
My position on this subject follows the traditional 
views of both management and labor against the use of compulsory 
arbitration. Both sides have historically recognized that great 
damage can be done to our system of collective bargaining if 
there is governmental intervention in setting the terms of 
collective bargaining agreements. One of the fundamental 
principles on which the National Labor Relations Act is based is 
that of free collective bargaining.2 The principle of free 
collective bargaining requires recognition of the corollary 
principle that employers and unions are free to establish "their 
own charter for the ordering of industrial relations . . .M3 
without government intervention. 
We know, of course, that the collective bargaining 
process is not really entirely free. Numerous restrictions are 
already imposed. Employer conduct at the bargaining table is 
subject to Board and court scrutiny. The Board defines the scope 
and subject of negotiations, and employer freedom to impose 
contract terms is limited by Board review and regulation. 
Employing interest arbitration as a remedy in first 
contract settings will have an obvious impact on the vital 
concept of allowing private ordering of agreements without 
H.K. Porter Co. V. NLRB. 397 U.S. 99, 108 (1970); NLRB V. 
American Nat'l Ins. Co.. 343 U.S. 395, 401-04 (1952). 
3
 Local 24. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliverf 358 U.S. 283, 
295 (1959). 
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government involvement. Indeed, even in Canada, where several 
provinces have implemented first contract arbitration, it has 
been recently stated that the process is doing "exactly" what it 
was not intended to do and has become "a substitute for free 
collective bargaining."4 
First contracts are and will remain difficult to 
negotiate. This difficulty, however, is generally not the result 
of unlawful employer conduct. There are a myriad of issues 
presented in any first contract setting. The parties' greatest 
problems tend to be over the so-called non-economic items of an 
agreement. Issues such as seniority, hours of work, job 
classifications, pay for time not worked, vacation eligibility, 
grievance procedures and subcontracting are but a few of the 
important and difficult items that the parties for the first time 
must address on a mutual basis. There is no cookie-cutter 
approach to any of these issues since they must be tailored to 
the specific work site. 
Additionally, the bargaining agenda of a union in a 
first contract setting often reflects the extent of promises made 
during the organizing campaign. Union positions on seniority, 
wages and benefits often will have the same "ring" as the 
statements made during the representation drive. Thus, reaching 
agreement in a first contract setting is not easy under the best 
of circumstances and the failure to reach agreement cannot simply 
be attributed to unlawful employer conduct. 
4
 Heenan, Issues For The Dunlop Commission; The Canadian 
Experience, NYU 47th Conf. on Labor (June 1, 1994) at p. 16. 
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i 
Most importantly, to permit interest arbitration in a 
first contract setting will significantly lessen the parties' 
incentive to reach agreement. Since the first contract, probably 
more than any other, sets out the basic terms of employment 
(e.g.. seniority, hours of work, fringe benefits), one can only 
wonder why a union would not want to press all of its demands 
with full knowledge that it will always have arbitration 
available to obtain an agreement. Thus, it is not surprising to 
find that the Canadian experience, however well intended, has 
been criticized as frustrating free collective bargaining. 
The fact that some propose constraints as to when 
arbitration would be imposed does not change the fundamental 
flaws present in the concept. For those who say it would only be 
invoked upon a finding of bad faith, we nonetheless foresee a new 
level of governmental scrutiny of the bargaining process and 
significant delays. Moreover, as noted by Roy Heenan's analysis 
of the Canadian experience, the use of the remedy as a limited 
one for so-called bad faith cases simply does not work. 
Similarly, for those who say that arbitration would 
only be invoked if a certain period of time elapses, we foresee 
no meaningful bargaining until that time came. Experience shows 
that under such circumstances, there will generally be no rush to 
reach agreement, since the ultimate presence of arbitration 
serves as a disincentive for early resolution. 
And, for those who think that final offer style 
arbitration will create an incentive for agreement, we know that 
this is not the case. Indeed, final offer arbitration in a first 
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contract setting can be, for both sides, a prescription for 
disaster. 
Having said this, I nonetheless believe that there are 
steps which can be taken to enhance the prospects of reaching 
agreement in a first contract setting. The Federal Mediation and 
Conciliation Service ("FMCS") could take on a much more effective 
role in bringing parties together. This, however, will require 
an improvement in the training and quality of the Service's 
mediators. 
Today, we face a new world of collective bargaining. 
Issues affecting agreement range from health care alternatives, 
401(k) options, gain-sharing plans, retiree health benefits and 
many other specialized issues which parties now confront on a 
regular basis. Moreover, knowledge of industry practices and 
global competition are critical to those at the bargaining table. 
Unfortunately, I do not believe that we have FMCS mediators who 
are trained or equipped with the knowledge necessary to deal with 
these issues so as to become a proactive force in bringing about 
agreement. 
The Commission should consider recommending the 
establishment of a training academy or program for mediators. 
Such a program would also afford a role for labor and management 
to help educate these individuals on the problems confronted at 
the bargaining table. Mediation offers the opportunity to 
maximize the statutory goal of freedom of contract without 
sacrificing the parties' ability to reach their own agreement. 
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It will, however, only be as successful as the people who are 
trained and selected to serve that role. 
ACCE8S TO EMPLOYER PROPERTY 
Another question raised by the Commission concerns 
whether unions should be granted greater access to employees 
during an organizational campaign. For the reasons discussed 
below, my answer is respectfully, "no.M 
As the Commission is well aware, the right of employees 
to communicate in a meaningful and effective manner has long been 
recognized as being within the ambit of Section 7 of the National 
Labor Relations Act. Recognition of this right, however, does 
not mean that an employer must surrender his property rights once 
a union organizational campaign commences. Quite the contrary, 
the Board and courts have repeatedly dealt with the issue of how 
best to accommodate the competing labor and management 
interests.5 As recently stated by the Supreme Court, Section 7 
"simply does not protect non-employee union organizers except in 
the rare case where 'the inaccessibility of employees makes 
ineffective the reasonable attempts by non-employees to 
communicate with them through the usual channels.'"6 
Affording access to unions whenever an employer 
communicates with his employees about unionization raises serious 
5
 See, e.g., Sears. Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. 
Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978); Lechmere, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992). 
6
 Lechmere. Inc. v. NLRB. 112 S. Ct. at 843 (quoting NLRB v. 
The Babcock and Wilcox Co.. 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956). 
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policy and constitutional questions.7 Given the sensitive 
balance established by case law between employers' property 
rights and employees' Section 7 rights, a generalized equal 
access rule is not appropriate. To justify an infringement of 
employer property rights, there must be a showing that such 
infringement is necessary. This general showing, in my view, has 
not been made. 
In addition to the potential abridgment of employer 
property rights, establishing an equal access rule might well 
occasion First Amendment problems. If an employer's right to 
address his employees on matters related to union organization is 
contingent on his allowing union organizers to enter his property 
to solicit employee support, one can seriously argue that the 
employer's right of free speech is being infringed. As the 
Supreme Court has noted, the so-called free speech provision of 
the Act, Section 8(c), "merely implements the First Amendment."8 
Thus, in other contexts, the Supreme Court, for 
example, has struck down a statute requiring newspapers to 
provide political candidates with free space to reply to any 
newspaper attack on the candidate's character.9 Similarly, the 
Supreme Court has struck down a state requirement that a 
See. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court of 
Tulare County. 16 Cal. 3d 392, 546 P.2d 687, appeal dismissed, 
429 U.S. 802 (1976) (California Supreme Court upholding an access 
rule of the California Agricultural Labor Relations Board in a 
four-three decision). 
8
 NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.. 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969). 
9
 Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo. 418 U.S. 241 
(1974). 
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privately owned utility include in its billing statement a speech 
of a third party.10 Like the editors of the newspaper or the 
utility, an employer required to provide access would have to 
yield some of the control which he is otherwise entitled to exert 
over his property and business affairs. Also, like these other 
owners, such an employer would have to foster points of view 
which he might find distasteful by surrendering his property to 
be used as a forum for their publication. Indeed, unions would 
be given greater access rights than other members of the public; 
and an employer might well decide that the best course is to 
limit communications with its employees, "thereby reducing the 
free flow of information and ideas that the First Amendment seeks 
to promote."11 
In sum, the balance between employees' organizational 
rights and employers' property rights is a delicate one and is 
unsuited to a general rule mandating access. 
IMPACT OF FEDERAL PREEMPTION AND 
INCREASED REGULATION OF THE WORK PLACE 
Another question posed by the Commission is how 
cooperation in mature bargaining relationships might be enhanced. 
This question overlaps to some extent some of the other issues 
posed by the Commission. I would like, however, to briefly 
comment on some facets of this inquiry. 
One of the threats to mature collective bargaining 
relationships is the emerging role of state legislation over 
10
 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n of 
Cal.. 475 U.S. 1 (1975). 
1 1
 Jd. at p . 14. 
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matters subject to collective bargaining. While at one time the 
concept of preemption under the National Labor Relations Act was 
well defined, I no longer believe that this is the case.12 The 
Supreme Court has, for example, now upheld the right of states to 
establish minimum health and severance benefits, rejecting the 
argument that such laws undercut the collective bargaining 
process by granting benefits employees might not have been able 
to, or even wanted to, bargain for. Decisions such as these will 
have a negative impact on the ability of employers and unions to 
create their own agreement. 
The same problem is now true with respect to allowing 
employees to mount actions that might otherwise have been 
resolved through grievance/arbitration procedures.13 All of 
v. 
this activity undermines the bargain struck between the parties 
and ultimately weakens the impact of the collective bargaining 
process. 
The impact is not just at the state and local level. 
Application of other federal laws also affects existing 
collective bargaining relationships. Examples today are 
unfortunately far too numerous. 
One area of recent conflict relates to the Americans 
With Disabilities Act. Under the ADA, employers have a duty to 
u
 See, New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor. 440 
U.S. 519 (1979); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts. 471 
U.S. 724 (1985); Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne. 482 U.S. 1 
(1987). 
13
 Compare. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck. 471 U.S. 202 (1985) 
with Linale v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc.. 486 U.S. 399 
(1988) . 
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make reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental 
limitations of otherwise qualified disabled applicants or 
employees, unless such accommodations would impose an undue 
hardship on the employer. On the other hand, the NLRA prohibits 
employers from unilaterally altering the terms and conditions of 
employment contained in a bargaining agreement without further 
bargaining. Thus, there is immediate tension between duties 
imposed under the NLRA and those imposed under the ADA. If an 
employer makes accommodations that modify existing contractual 
restrictions without bargaining, it can be in breach of its duty 
to bargain obligation. 
While the EEOC and NLRB have endeavored to try to reach 
some accommodation to reconcile these and other issues, these 
conflicting statutory schemes place employers and unions in a 
difficult position. The same is true when employees are allowed 
to litigate issues which can be appropriately resolved under 
existing grievance and arbitration procedures. The Commission 
should encourage giving primacy to the bargaining relationship 
and the dispute resolution procedures contained in collective 
bargaining agreements. Indeed, there should be clear legislative 
intent as to the preemptive scope of the collective bargaining 
process so as to avoid the problems now faced under both state 
and federal law. 
N0N-EXCLU8IVB REPRESENTATION 
Finally, I would like to briefly comment on the 
Commission's inguiry concerning non-majority representation. The 
Commission has heard from the AFL-CIO that the law should provide 
WAMAIN Doc 89499.1 
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a mechanism for workers to designate a representative, even if 
there is less than majority support, and impose upon an employer 
the obligation to meet and confer with that representative.14 
This recommendation is a recipe for chaos. 
The concept of "meet and confer" was principally used 
in public sector jurisdictions as an alternative vehicle to 
full-scale collective bargaining. Meet and confer statutes were 
generally replaced by statutes giving full-scale bargaining 
rights. Nonetheless, the scope of the duty imposed under meet 
and confer laws was not insubstantial. Moreover, such laws were 
generally found in jurisdictions where there was no existing 
right to bargain. Here, of course, it is being presented as a 
means to require employer negotiations with some segment of an 
employer's work force even though a majority of employees have 
not chosen such representation. 
The problems posed by this proposal are many and 
varied. First, what is the threshold level of interest to 
trigger an obligation to recognize a union as the representative 
for a group of employees? Is the number 5%, 10%, 20% or higher? 
Whatever the number, is each group permitted to "represent" the 
same job classifications? How do you determine if employee 
interest is sustained? Is an employer allowed to poll the 
employees? What is the nature of the bargaining obligation? How 
do you prevent conflicting bargaining demands and/or the 
14
 Statement before the Commission For The Future Of Worker 
Management Relations by David M. Silberman, Director, AFL-CIO 
Task Force On Labor Law at p. 15. 
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establishment of rival groups which may be based on race sex 
national origin or other lines? 
These are not academic concerns. Indeed, these 
concerns expose the folly of this proposal. In a plant or 
office, an employer could well have to deal with numerous groups 
all with their own agenda. Indeed, such a world would invite 
conflict, as agreement with one group would be used as the 
"floor" for agreement by the next group. The concept of being 
whipsawed would take on even larger meaning. The great virtue of 
a union as the exclusive representative would disappear and the 
employer would be obligated to mediate the conflicts presented 
within its own work force. 
At a time when we talk of becoming a more productive 
society, such a proposal takes us many steps backward. The shop 
floor would have the potential of becoming the meeting room 
floor. Instead of reducing conflict, the process would likely 
generate greater conflict as one group seeks to outdo another. 
The meet and confer standard, as public sector experience would 
attest, only offered confusion and frustration as to what the 
parties had to talk about or agree upon. Establishing such a 
standard on a non-majority basis would only magnify that 
confusion and frustration. 
Moreover, the very fragmentation that the law tries 
now to prevent with respect to bargaining units — in both the 
public and private sector — would be potentially present in 
every work site. Thus, in my view, this concept is contrary to 
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the policies underlying the Mission Statement of this Commission, 
and should be rejected. 
\ 
\ 
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